Publications

April 2022 Games

Correcting for Random Budgets in Revealed Preference Experiments

(Joint with John Rehbeck)

We examine how the random budget method in revealed preference experiments interact with measures of choice consistency.

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Working Papers

Gender Bias and Learning in Social Networks

(joint with Sam Stelnicki and Xiaomin Bian)

Does gender bias play a role in information exchange and social learning? We experimentally investigate the degree to which gender influences belief formation in a social network.

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Global Games with Strategic Substitutes: An Experimental Investigation

We experimentally investigate behavior in a market entry game with strategic substitutes using the Global Games paradigm of Harrison and Jara-Moroni (2021). Our experiment provides some support for the theory. A majority of the subjects adopt threshold strategies with few mistakes. While the estimated thresholds deviate from point predictions, the comparative statics still hold. Finally, a majority of outcomes correspond to the global games equilibrium even in regions of multiplicity.

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To follow the Herd or break away? Overconfidence and Social Learning

(Joint with Jason Tayawa)

We experimentally analyze how overconfidence in one’s relative expertise impacts social learning in the lab. We modify the social learning settings of Anderson and Holt (1997) to allow for signal accuracy to vary with an individual’s skill. Our results show that overconfidence can affect welfare in social learning settings by inducing people to break away from existing herds.

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Understanding Entry Games using Laboratory Experiments

(joint with John Rehbeck – Submitted)

We examine how economic experiments can be used to examine behavior in entry games.

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Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in Public Goods Games: Comparing Teams with Individuals

(joint with John Kagel and Christina Gore)

We investigate behavior in Public Goods Games under both monetary and non-monetary punishment options with teams of two as decision makers. We find that teams are teams contribute significantly lower under non-monetary punishment, compared to monetary punishment.

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Sharing information: Could Experts Consolidate?

(Joint with Jason Tayawa)

We develop a model of information sharing using cooperative game theory. We demonstrate non-existence of the core under standard assumptions in the literature (perfect correlation or conditional independence). We find that strong complementarity of information structures is sufficient for the existence of a core.

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A Matching Theory Approach to the Time Minimization Assignment Problem.

We analyze the time minimization assignment problem through the lens of matching theory to incorporate notions of stability. We find inconclusive evidence of any particular mechanism outperforming any others.

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Works in Progress

How Far I'll Go: Coordination with Disparate Types

(joint with J. Braxton Gately and Ashley McCrea)

Does group identity play a role in successful coordination?

Rational Inattention with Non-Bayesians

(joint with Jason Tayawa)

We examine how biased belief updating influences behavior in a rational inattention setting.